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Abstract
Legitimate as well as illegitimate organizations and entities are gaining access to information
about social media (SM) users through illegal, extralegal, and quasi-legal means. Worse still,
many organizations and individuals using SM have become targets and victims of cybercrimes.
SM have also led to an exposure of unethical and illegal conducts within some organizations.
One estimate suggested that 36% of social networking users have reported experiencing malware attacks through their profiles. Another study suggested that one in four companies have
become cybercrime victims via social networking sites. Likewise, about a quarter of employers
surveyed by the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics in 2009 had disciplined an employee for improper activities on social networking sites. Organizations that fail to take appropriate technological and behavioral measures related to SM are likely to suffer reputation damages,
loss of customers' confidence, and other types of economic losses. The goal of this paper is to
develop a framework that provides a simple, explicit mechanism for understanding privacy and
security issues associated with SM. To achieve this goal, we draw upon literatures on diverse
areas such as institutional theory, marketing and criminology. Specifically, we examine how various institutions from the standpoint of SM superimpose in a unique interaction with SM related
technologies’ natures that influence businesses’ and consumers’ privacy and security. We discuss how various features of SM related technologies such as newness (leading to ineffectiveness of existing IT security products), complexity (difficulty to understand SM’s functioning)
and attractiveness of SM as a cybercrime target (availability of information with superior targetability and huge size and rapid growth of SM). We also examine how regulative institutions
(lack of laws to deal with SM as well as lack of enforcement of existing laws), normative institutions (lack of ethical and professional guidelines) and cognitive institutions (lack of precautionary
measures and lack of defensive measures or counterpoison) have contributed to a lack of behavioral and attitudinal measures to ensure privacy and security.
Keywords: Social Media, Rare Enemy Syndrome, Targetability, Privacy and Security, Institutions
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Introduction
The rapid growth of social media (SM) has
posed fundamental security and privacy challenges. SM have attracted various actors that
engage in illegal, extra-legal, and sometimes
criminal activities. As evidenced by the recent
attacks on Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace,
cyber-criminals are exploiting the viral nature
of Web 2.0 and social networking sites
(Kshetri, 2010a). In April 2010, the U.K.’s
Nottinghamshire Police reported that crimes
associated with Facebook that were reported
to the agency (e.g., sex crimes, verbal abuse,
assault) increased by 346% during the previous 22 months (Peppiatt, 2010). According to
Kaspersky Lab, in the first quarter of 2010,
Facebook was the No. 4 most targeted site
by phishers, after PayPal, eBay and HSBC
(Richmond, 2010).
Preliminary studies indicate a high rate of returns associated with organizations’ implementation of SM for marketing activities. A
study conducted by vitrue (http://vitrue.com/)
indicated that in the average the value of a
'Fan' on SM is $3.60 (Morrissey, 2010). Yet
privacy and security concerns have hindered
organizations’ adoption of SM. For instance,
companies are increasingly limiting their employees’ access to social networking sites.
Yet, about a quarter of employers surveyed
by the Society of Corporate Compliance and
Ethics in 2009 had disciplined at least one
employee for improper activities on social
networking sites (Chen, 2010). A survey
commissioned by Robert Half Technology
found that 21 % of chief information officers
have limited the personal use of SM sites in
the workplace. Note that a previous survey
commissioned by Robert Half Technology
found that 58 % of companies have banned
SM sites altogether (Magder, 2010). A study
by Sophos indicates that 12-17% of organizations surveyed control access to social networking sites due to concerns related to malware and data leakage (Lardinois, 2009).
Experts argue that in order to prevent cybercrimes, it is important for users and platform
owners to consider the ethical, legal, and
technical issues associated with SM (Chre-
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tien, Ryan, Chretien and Kind, 2009; Lagu,
Kaufman, Asch, and Armstrong, 2010; Ramsey and Venkatesan, 2010; Thompson, Dawson and Ferdig, 2008). The productive use of
SM in marketing activities, tempered with an
appropriate level of privacy and security, is a
strategic policy action item, and, a theoretical
issue that adjoins broad-based substantive
interests within marketing to various social
science disciplines. Although prior researchers have acknowledged the role of SM, they
have paid relatively less attention to how privacy and security issues are affecting the diffusion patterns of SM. Thus, it is important for
managers to better understand privacy and
security issues associated with SM.
The purpose of our study is to contribute to
filling this void. We examine how institutional
and technological environments are linked to
behavioral and attitudinal measures to ensure
privacy and security in SM. We develop a
framework that provides a simple, explicit
mechanism for understanding privacy and
security issues associated with SM.
To
achieve this goal, we draw upon literatures on
diverse areas such as institutional theory,
marketing, and criminology.
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first providing a brief survey of privacy and security concerns associated with SM.
Next, we examine the institutional and technological environments and relevant issues
facing SM. Then, we discuss privacy and security issues within the context of the specific
environments and provide some practical implications. The final section provides concluding comments.

Privacy and Security Concerns
Associated with SM: A Survey
The rise in privacy and security breaches in
SM can be treated as part of a larger trend of
the rapid growth in the global cybercrime industry (Kshetri, 2010a). Due to the government’s constant public announcements of
internet security breaches and pending cyberterrorism, there is a heightened sense of fear
and anxiety about cybercrimes involving SM
among individuals and businesses. In this
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section, we organize the discussion by focusing separately on privacy and security issues
facing businesses and consumers and also
on various forms of cybercrimes associated
with SM, which can be considered as a conceptual superset of privacy and security issues.

Impacts on businesses
A survey conducted by IBM found that U.S.
businesses worry more about cybercrimes
than about physical crimes (Christian Science
Monitor, 2006). One estimate suggested that
one in four companies report attacks via social networking sites (Kaplan, 2009). Advertisers have been complaining about click
fraud of up to 100% (Techcrunch.com, 2009).
Note that a large proportion of Facebook revenue comes from pay-per-click (PPC) advertising from small self-serve advertisers. It is
reported that some advertisers spend
$30,000 a day on ads on Facebook (Arrington, 2009). SM are also associated with
threats such as phishing and the leakage of
intellectual property (Kavur, 2010). According
to a study by Open DNS (www.opendns.com)
Facebook was the second biggest phishing
target after PayPal and was the most blocked
website by companies (Cooter, 2011).

Impacts on consumers
An IBM survey released in 2006 found that
there were three times more Americans, who
thought they would be more likely victims of a
computer crime “in the next year” than of a
physical crime (Keizer, 2006). According to
Consumer Reports’ State of the Net survey
released in May 2010, 9% of social network
users experienced some forms of abuse within the past year (e.g., malware infections,
scams, identity theft or harassment) (Woollacott, 2010). In June 2009, laptops of several
business school students at Yale University
were simultaneously infected, which was
suspected to have spread through Facebook
(Finkle, 2009). Cyber-criminals have also targeted Twitter users by using links with malware that tag current topics (Voigt, 2009).
Cyber-criminals’ actions are centered around
popular SM activities. One of them, for in-

stance, is online games. A Cisco study released in July 2010 indicated that 7% of Facebook users across the world access the
site to play the interactive game, Farmville,
which its users spend an average of 68
minutes a day on virtual farming. Likewise,
another game, Mafia Wars, is played by 5%
of Facebook users daily. Each user that
played Mafia Wars spent 52 minutes on the
game while at work. Cisco believes that
cyber-criminals are developing ways to deliver malware via these games (The Straits
Times, 2010).

Types and classification of cybercrimes associated with SM
Glaser (1971) identified and classified various
types of crimes, including: predatory crimes
against property, predatory crimes against
person, illegal service crimes, and public disorder crimes. Most of these can be extended
in the context of the cyberspace, more specifically into SM. Cyber attacks can be classified
using various criteria. One way to classify
them is to consider whether they are directed
against an intended target (e.g., targeted and
opportunistic attacks) or are just broad-stroke
targeting. Cyber attacks can also be classified into two categories based on whether
they are predatory or market-based. A further
way to classify cybercrimes is related to the
relative roles of human and technology elements-- Type I and Type II cybercrimes.
Targeted vs. opportunistic attacks
In targeted attacks, specific tools are used
against specific SM targets. Targeted attacks
are carried out by skilled hackers with expertise to do serious damages. Some of them
are motivated by financial gains. Targeted
attacks are also initiated by terrorists, rival
companies (e.g., click frauds in Facebook),
ideological hackers and/or government agencies. Hackers that were initially involved in
mass attacks are moving towards more sophisticated focused attacks that target SM
sites.
Opportunistic attacks, on the other hand, entail releasing worms and viruses that spread
indiscriminately across the Internet. Oppor-
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tunistic attacks are less dangerous than targeted attacks and have smaller financial
ramifications.
Predatory cybercrimes vs. market-based
cybercrimes
Cybercrimes can also be grouped into two
types: predatory cybercrimes for profit and
market-based cybercrimes (Naylor, 2005).
Predatory cybercrimes can be defined as illegal acts in the cyberspace in which "someone
definitely and intentionally takes or damages
the person or property of another" (Glaser,
1971). An example could be stealing money
from someone’s bank account using the information fraudulently received from SM users. From the national GNP point of view,
these acts do not produce new goods or services. They simply redistribute the existing
wealth. Market-based cybercrimes, on the
other hand, generate new incomes rather
than redistributing the existing wealth (Naylor,
2005). Such crimes occur, for example, in the
sales of stolen credit card information and
illegal drugs online.
Type I and Type II cybercrimes involving
SM
Gordon and Ford (2006) have divided cybercrime into distinct categories. In their categorization, Type I cybercrime mostly contains
technological elements, such as malware attacks via social-networking sites, which are
growing in volume recently (Whitney, 2010).
A study estimated that 36% of social networking users reported experiencing malware attacks through their profiles (Tuazon and Mark,
2010). It should be noted that login details
from social networking websites can also be
bought in the underground economy. The
Sydney Morning Herald (2010) reported that
a Russian hacker known as “Kirllos,” who
was living in New Zealand, was offering the
login details (i.e. usernames and passwords)
of 1.5 million Facebook users. The price was
NZ$62.70 (about US$ 44) per 1000 accounts
sold on an underground hacker forum.
Type II cybercrimes have mainly human elements (Gordon and Ford, 2006). Turning now
to the specific context of cybercrimes target-
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ing SM sites, it is important to note that
crimes such as "Facebook phishing" are rising. It is possible that a cyber-criminal may
claim to be a friend and convince a Facebook
user to share his/her password. This is a very
serious security breach since over 50% Facebook users were found to employ the same
password for their individual bank accounts
(Rodgers, 2009).

Institutional and Technological Environment Facing SM
As a visual aid, Figure 1 schematically represents how privacy and security issues in SM,
and more broadly cybercrimes, are tightly
linked to the institutional and technological
environment. We discuss building blocks of
the model in this section. An understanding of
model would help organizations take technological, behavioral and perceptual/attitudinal
measures to combat the threat of cybercrime.
Organizations that fail to take appropriate
technological and behavioral measures related to SM are likely to suffer reputation damages, loss of customers' confidence, and other types of economic losses (Figure 1).
Technological Environment
A firm’s strategy is tightly linked to the technological environment within which it is operating (Audretsch, 1991). In this paper’s context, we discuss three main characteristics of
technologies enabling SM: newness, complexity, and superior targetability. Let’s take a
look at each of the components in turn.
Newness
The number of malware products targeting
social networking sites is increasing rapidly.
One estimate suggested that the number of
malware products spreading via social networking sites increased from about 10,000 in
2007 to over 25,000 during 2008 (Tanase,
2010). Cyber-criminals are attracted by SM
sites’ economies of scale and effectiveness.
Due to the newness of SM, however, most
existing IT security products are ineffective.
Many SM sites are found to contain vulnerabilities that are undetectable and untraceable
to most available security technologies.
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Figure 1 - A framework for understanding security and privacy issues facing SM

For instance, IT security products (such as,
Web filtering, firewalls and network security
devices) are inadequate to deal with malware
targeting SM sites (Kavur, 2010). In sum,
conventional security software is of little help
to deal with vulnerabilities involving SM (Null,
2001).

Complexity
Another problem concerns the difficulty in understanding SM’s functioning. Experts have,
for instance, complained that SM users are
not given simple ways to understand “what
personal information is being made available
to whom” (Marks, 2010). Cowan (2010) has
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summarized complexity in Facebook’s privacy measures best: “Rapid growth, a pile-up of
new features and ad hoc responses to previous privacy concerns meant the site's privacy
controls had become maddeningly complex,
with users required to navigate 50 different
settings and 170 different options”.
We can further illustrate SM’s complexity with
an example of Facebook ads. Before we proceed, it is important to note that Facebook
served 176.3 billion ads in the first quarter of
2010, which is more than by Yahoo (Cowan,
2010). Note that ads work differently in Facebook compared to search engines such as
Google and yahoo. While an ad can be seen
on the parked domain page, or when an Internet users types in a keyword, it may not be
possible to see a Facebook ad. This is because Facebook ads are “hyper targeted”
based on “deep demographic data” (Tanase,
2010). For instance, using the self-serve ads,
an advertiser can target “users that are female, aged 13-17, and, who live in San Francisco” (Cutler and Marshal, 2009). A user
that does not fit this profile does not see the
ad.
Facebook advertisers have claimed that their
ads are clicked by competitors, leading to
higher costs (Arrington, 2009). A high level
of complexity may make it difficult for an advertiser to track fraudulent activities associated with an ad.
The rise of cybercrimes targeting social network users is also associated with and facilitated by the proliferation of third party applications on various SM platforms (Ramsey
and Venkatesan, 2010). For one thing, they
have increased complexity. Many such applications allow users to store, organize and
exchange information. In April 2010, Facebook started giving third-party applications
more access to user data (Fletcher and Ford,
2010). Some Apps, which used to be allowed
to keep user data only for 24 hours, can store
them indefinitely unless users uninstall them.
Facebook Instant Personalization launched in
spring 2010 lets businesses create recommendation based on user data (Fletcher and
Ford, 2010).
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Most impressive, as of July 2010, the independent developer, Zynga was estimated to
have 235 million active Facebook users a
month playing games developed by the company (foreign.peacefmonline.com, 2010). A
common complaint about many applications
developed by independent programmers,
however, is that there has been a lack of
basic security measures and procedures in
these apps (Soghoian, 2008). Worse still,
some are designed to steal personal information. A case in point is the Facebook application, “Dislike” button recently created by
a third-party developer. This was reported to
be a malware, which created revenue for its
developer when users completed a survey. It
also gave the developer access to personal
data and used Facebook accounts for generating spam messages (Pert, 2010). In August
2010, Facebook Security (http://www.faceboo
k.com/security) issued a warning about the
bogus Dislike button scam.
Targetability
In the context of this paper, targetability is
related to a legitimate or illegitimate organization’s capability to reach an attractive target.
Attractiveness of SM as a cybercrime target
Two explanations related to attractiveness of
SM can be suggested for the rapid growth of
cybercrimes targeting SM. A simple, straightforward explanation is that cyber-criminals
consider SM sites as a lucrative target due to
their rapid growth. One estimate suggested
that, as of July 2010, 74% of the world’s Internet population visited social networking
sites, and in the average, Internet users spent
an average of six hours per month on such
sites (nielsen.com, 2010). The number of
people using Facebook reached 500 million
on 21 July 2010 (Pepitone, 2010). Particularly,
South Korea’s leading social media site,
Naver, was reported to attract 95% of the
country’s Internet population every month
(nielsen.com, 2010). Likewise, eight out of
the top 20 websites in the UAE incorporate
SM elements (McArthur, 2010).
A second factor related to attractiveness (and
often associated with privacy violation and
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security breaches on SM sites) is data quality.
Data and information that is available on such
sites are of superior quality. Unsurprisingly,
legitimate enterprises, as well, as criminal
outfits find it too tempting to self-regulate, and
often actively seek to covertly gain access to
the best quality information available in SM
networks. It is important to note that target
attractiveness depends on offenders’ perceptions of victims (Kshetri, 2010a). A lawsuit
filed in August 2009 five individuals in the Orange County Superior Court claimed that Facebook’s business model is “designed to harvest as much personal and private information as possible in easiest, quickest, and
most innocuous-looking manner possible”,
which is shared with “third parties for commercial purposes and economic benefit”
(softpedia.com, 2009).
Prior research indicates that crime opportunity is a function of target attractiveness, which
is measured in monetary or symbolic value
and portability (Clarke, 1995). In this regard,
availability of information with superior targetability, as well as, huge size and rapid
growth make SM as an attractive target for
cyber-criminals. In summary, SM’s popularity,
as well, as the amount and quality of information stored on SM platforms make them an
attractive cybercrime target (Ramsey and
Venkatesan, 2010).
Institutional Environment
Institutions are defined as “macro-level rules
of the game” (North, 1990, p. 27), which consist of "formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes
of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics" (North, 1996). Institutional theory is
described as “a theory of legitimacy seeking”
(Dickson, BeShers and Gupta, 2004). To gain
legitimacy, organizations adopt behaviors irrespective of the effect on organizational efficiency (Campbell, 2004). For instance, it was
reported that in China, Microsoft blocks bloggers from posting politically objectionable
words and, when Google was operating in the
country, it shut down when users looked for
sensitive words.

Institutional influence on the SM industry becomes an admittedly complex process (Dickson, BeShers and Gupta, 2004) when organizations have to derive legitimacy from multiple sources such as employees, clients, local
communities, professional and trade associations and governments. Scott (2001) proposed three institutional pillars: (i) regulative;
(ii) normative and (iii) cognitive. These pillars
relate to “legally sanctioned”, “morally governed” and “recognizable, taken-for-granted”
behaviors respectively (Scott, Ruef, Mendel,
and Caronna, 2000).
An important point to note is that institutional
actors’ responses lag behind the technological changes (Brenner, 2004; Katyal, 2001;
Kshetri, 2010a). This can be attributed to institutional inertia. Moreover, institutional actors vary in their timing of responses to a given change in technology.
Regulative Institutions
Lack of laws to deal with SM
The SM industry legal system is evolving
more slowly compared to the SM technology
development. As of August 2010, only three
countries in the world-- the UK, New Zealand
and Australia-- had developed legal framework on the use of SM for litigation purposes
(Kowalski, 2010). In August 2010, Singapore’s Supreme Court has released a Consultation Paper on the use of SM for litigation
purposes including service of documents
(Supreme Court of Singapore 2010). Singapore is expected to be the fourth country to
have a comprehensive legal framework on
SM.
Until 2009, the U.S. did not have a law which
held marketers liable for false statements
published on blogs and social networking
websites. In 2009, the FTC revised its Guides
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising. The revision defined instances in which a blogger’s relationship with a company is necessary to disclose
to avoid misleading consumers (Sullivan,
2009). This was the FTC’s first revision in its
guidelines for endorsements and testimonials
since 1980 (Kee, 2009).
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Moreover, some economies’ existing laws
have been ineffective to deal with fraudulent
activities associated with SM. For instance,
consider differences between the approaches
of China and the U.S in dealing with astroturfing in SM. Note that astroturfing is political,
advertising, or public relations campaigns that
are formally planned by an organization, but
are designed to mask the nature of the originator in an attempt to create the illusion of
being spontaneous, popular, and "grassroots"
behavior. SM have opened a new avenue for
astroturfers. It was reported that, in New York
State, a cosmetic surgery company had its
employees pretend to be satisfied customers
in writing online testimonials. In 2009, the
New York attorney general received a
$300,000 settlement from the company for
this action (Lazar, 2010).
Similarly, a Business Week article (June 23,
2008) reported that China’s public relations
firms such as Daqi.com, Chinese Web Union
and CIC charge US$500-25,000 monthly to
monitor online posts. They help minimize the
impact of negative information and create
positive brand value for the company. There
are reports that these PR firms hire students
to write good posts about certain brands and
to criticize the competition. While critics are
concerned about the manipulation of consumer reviews and paid reviews, Astroturfers
in China haven’t faced legal problems.
One way to understand the China-U.S. difference is to consider their experiences with
modern capitalism. Many successful firms in
mature market economies are guided by customer orientation and demonstrate their
commitment to customer focus. Customers in
these economies exhibit a low tolerance for
acceptance of poor behavior if businesses
and suppliers do not fulfill their implicit and
explicit commitments. Due to China's short
history of modern capitalism, Chinese clients,
and customers are more likely to tolerate an
absence of business ethics and a low level of
product and service quality and/or reliability.
Improper enforcement of laws
Brenner (2004) notes: “. . . the traditional
model of law enforcement is a compilation of
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past practices that have been deemed effective in dealing with the phenomena it confronts. The model’s general strategy, the reactive approach, is one that has been in use
since antiquity”. Such an approach has been
highly ineffective in the SM industry since SM
crosses all borders.
In addition to incomplete regulation, criticisms
of improper enforcement are also significant.
There have been concerns about possible
overreach by law enforcement agencies. In
the U.S., for instance, thanks to the 2001 Patriot Act, the federal government can ask service providers to submit personal details of an
Internet user’s online activities without telling
the Internet user about it. The FBI's internal
audits indicated the possibility of “overreaching” by the agency in accessing Internet users’ information (Zittrain, 2009). Unlike the
U.S., the Chinese government has no limit on
covert monitoring of its citizenry. The Chinese version of Skype instant messaging
software is used to monitor texting conversations and will actively block undesirable
words and phrases (Zittrain, 2009).
The FBI is reported to be in dilemma regarding the use of fake identities to investigate
cybercrimes on SM. According to a FBI document reported by Hoover (2010), despite the
potential of undercover operations in gaining
access to private information, the agency has
expressed concerns that undercover use of
personal information may be complicated. If
the agents do not use their own name, such
information gathering can be considered unauthorized and/or illegal. The agency cited
complications over Lori Drew’s trial, who was
acquitted of cyber-bullying a teen who later
committed suicide.
The e-commerce industry is undergoing a
major technological upheaval. In such situations, for various actors, the institutional context may not provide organizing templates,
models for action, and sources of legitimacy
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). In most
cases, such changes create confusion and
uncertainty and produce an environment that
lacks norms, templates, and models about
appropriate strategies and structures (New-
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man, 2000). A lack of regulatory templates is
reflected in substantively inconsistent responses of major SM companies to law enforcement requests. Hoover (2010) summarizes the FBI’s experiences in dealing with the
top three social networking sites:
… … .Facebook is "often cooperative" with
law enforcement emergency requests for information, while MySpace requires law enforcement to provide a search warrant to see
private messages less than 181 days old.
Twitter, meanwhile, is apparently even less
helpful than MySpace, as the presentation
notes it has no contact number for law enforcement to call, only retains the last log-in
IP address, has no guide for law enforcement, and will not produce data without a
warrant or subpoena.

Normative Institutions
Lack of ethical and professional guidelines
Cisco chief security officer John N. Stewart
observed that organizations tend to be slower
in the introduction of data integrity policies
compared to consumers’ adoption of new
technology (The Straits Times, 2010). The
same is true of professional associations.
Professional and ethical guidelines regarding
posts on social networking have not been
well-developed. In the medical world, for instance, there arguably is a lack of clear
guidelines as to what constitutes an unethical
or unprofessional online conduct for physicians (Lagu, Kaufman and Asch, 2004;
Thompson, Dawson and Ferdig, 2008).
Illegal or questionable activities such as violation of patient confidentiality are taking place
in the social networking sites without the violators’ intent. In a survey conducted among
U.S. medical schools to assess professionalism in medical students’ online posts, 60% of
the respondents reported incidents of their
medical students posting online content that
were unprofessional and 13% violated patient
confidentiality. The study also found that only
few schools had policies to deal with such
violations. Illegal or questionable activities
(such as, violation of patient confidentiality)
are taking place in the social networking sites

without the violators’ knowledge or intent
(Chretien, Ryan, Chretien and Kind, 2009).
Many app developers have also failed to follow ethical guidelines and principles. The
Hong Kong-based developer, Pencake had
developed the popular "Create Your Quiz"
app, which was Facebook's No. 3 most popular outside developer behind Zynga and Electronic Arts. In July 2010, Facebook announced that it disabled Pencake’s apps because Pencake had allegedly violated the
"main principles" of Facebook’s platform policies and codes of ethics. Facebook’s code of
ethics requires that a user must not spam or
infringe on members' privacy.
We cannot really take the deletion of a single
developer’s apps as "proof positive" that SM
providers, such as Facebook, may be serious
about ensuring security and privacy of users’
information. Cowan (2010) argues: “[w]hile
Facebook doesn't sell users' information to
advertisers, it remains unclear what happens
to the personal data harvested by the dozens
of games, quizzes, personality tests and other time wasters that clutter Facebook”.
Prior researchers have suggested that less
visible players (e.g., independent developers)
are more likely to engage in unethical and
even illegal practices compared to more visible players (e.g., Facebook). Why might this
be the case? For one thing, less visible players are less likely to be spotlighted by the
media. To examine why firms show a differential tendency to engage in and respond to
potentially demeaning and reputationdamaging activities (e.g., violating SM users’
privacy and engaging in fraudulent activities)
it would be helpful to consider the stigmatization process associated with such activities. A
central concept here is arbiters. Note that arbiters’ views and/or actions have influence
over social behavior.
Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, and Hambrick (2008)
argue that arbiters’ “constituent-minded
sensemaking” influences the stigmatization
process. They have identified three categories of “arbiters”—social, legal, and economic.
Social arbiters include members of the press,
governance watchdog groups, academics,
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and activists. Legal arbiters are those who
enforce rules and regulations. Economic arbiters make decisions about engaging in economic exchange with individuals.
News media reports serve as an intermediary
affecting the perceptions of the market audience about a firm’s scandalous and “nonconforming” behaviors (Rindova, Pollock, and
Hayward, 2006). Media reports have also
played a critical role in the criminalization of
computer crimes (Hollinger and LanzaKaduce, 1988). Prior research indicates that
the extent to which arbiters and other external
actors criticize, devalue, or question a firm
(following a reputation-damaging event) is a
function of the firm’s external visibility and
reputation (Rhee and Valdez, 2009). In the
automobile industry, for instance, media are
more likely to target and write negative comments on recalls by higher reputation automakers than on the lower reputation automakers (Haunschild and Rhee, 2004; Rhee
and Haunschild, 2006). Consistent with theory, SM actors with a higher degree of external
visibility seem to experience more scrutiny
and direct more efforts toward preventing privacy and security breaches.
In April 2010, four U.S. Senators argued that
Facebook needed to enhance privacy
measures (Liedtke, 2010). The Electronic Privacy Information Centre and 15 other groups
filed a complaint about Facebook's instant
personalization with the Federal Trade Commission in May 2010 (Cowan, 2010). The
Federal Trade Commission examined the privacy and data collection practices of social
networking sites including Facebook (Liedtke,
2010). Likewise, in March 2010, Jim Gamble,
chief executive of the Child Exploitation and
Online Protection (CEOP) criticized Facebook after investigators found that a convicted murderer met his teenage victim through
a fake Facebook profile (Belfast Telegraph,
2010).
Facebook and other SM sites responded by
announcing some security measures. For instance, Bebo and Facebook introduced the
safety application ClickCEOP. ClickCEOP
buttons were developed to protect users un-
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der 18 from cyber-bullies and other abuses.
That may be a small comfort for Facebook
users’, parents. Likewise, Facebook Beacon,
which allowed sharing users' activity on thirdparty sites (e.g., eBay and Fandango) with
friends was modified following complaints
from users and privacy advocacy groups
(Fletcher and Ford, 2010).
Cognitive Institutions
The institutions associated with cognitive
programs are built on mental maps of individual users and thus function primarily at the
individual level (Huff, 1990). Many effects can
serve as cognitive feedback depending on
the nature and motivation of the actor. Put
differently, cognitive systems influence the
lens through which users view the risks involved in SM (Scott, 2001). SM users’ skills,
expertise, experience, knowledge, and technical know-how can be considered as components of interest for cognitive institutions.
Precautionary measures
Most SM users are found to perform poorly in
risk assessment exercises involving their information online. The Australian Federal Police AFP's high tech crime group recently
conducted a trial among a group of Facebook
users and found that 98 % of them had put
enough information on their personal pages
to allow identities to be stolen (Neighbour,
2010). Similarly, Sophos’ study conducted in
2008 found that 40% of Internet users used
the same password for all websites they accessed (Miller and Stone, 2009). According
to Consumer Reports’ State of the Net survey
released in May 2010, 3% of SM users admitted mentioning when they were away from
home, 52% posted their full birth date, information 21% posted photos of children, 13%
posted children's names and 8% provided
home street address (Woollacott, 2010). Note
too that according to Britain's fraud prevention agency, Cifas a recent trend has been
the rise in identity fraud which makes use of
the victim's current address (Salmon, 2010).
Experts argue that employers should avoid
encouraging untrained and unmonitored employees to blog about their company's prod-
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ucts and services. This is especially important
if an employer is concerned about its goodwill
or it recognizes that SM may have a potential
to expose private company practices that can
be perceived as unfair or deceptive (Lazar,
2010). Professional service organizations,
comprising highly trained and licensed professionals such as physicians, radiologists
and lawyers--known as “extreme” professional services, extensively rely on tacit
knowledge and long training periods (Levy,
Goelman, Yu and Paging, 2006; Levy and
Yu, 2006; Singh and Wachter, 2008). These
organizations are greatly concerned about
security issues associated with SM . Boston
Medical Center (BMC), a private hospital center affiliated with Boston University, offers a
case in point. BMC blocks access to all SM
websites using security software from Websense Inc. Users who attempt to access SM
sites such as Facebook, YouTube or Twitter
are shown a page indicating that their destination is off-limits. Brad Blake, director of IT
at BMC noted that if BMC employees created
a Facebook account and patients to be
friends, "that would constitute a security
breach". He went on saying that “[o]ur senior
management has felt it easier just to block
these sites rather than trying to police and
manage them" (Tucci, 2010).
A failure to understand the context of SM use
is also likely to lead to an exposé of potentially unethical and even illegal behaviors and
practices. For instance, in 2009, a Facebook
profile led to a cancellation of a Canadian
woman’s disability payments by her insurance company. The reason was that her profile on social networking sites claimed she
was no longer depressed. The insurance
company said it had seen photos of the
woman on Facebook, enjoying herself on
nights out and on a beach vacation (Cross,
2009).
A final point is that younger SM users perform
poorly on precautionary measures compared
to older ones. For instance, a study found
that 22% of all Internet users made five or
more pieces of personal information (e.g.,
birth date, home address, cellphone number)
available on their social networking pages.

The proportion was 32% for people between
the ages of 18 and 32 (Cowan, 2010).
Defensive measures
An understanding of manipulative techniques
used by various creatures to fool their enemies is of particular relevance for cybercrimes involving SM. In particular, a phenomenon proposed by Dawkins (1982) called the
“rare enemy syndrome,” provides a helpful
theoretical perspective for understanding how
victims often fall to new unfamiliar baits or
lures. The basic idea behind rare enemy syndrome is simple. The enemy’s manipulation is
so rare that evolutionary development has not
yet progressed to the point that the victim has
an effective counter poison (de Jong, 2001).
From the potential victim’s standpoint, one
important point to note about social networking is that most SM users are young. For instance, while 52% of the population in Singapore used SM in 2010, the proportions were
95% for the 15-19 age-group and 89% for the
20-29 age-group (Supreme Court of Singapore, 2010). In this regard, the teens’ and
youth's cognitive skills and competencies,
and, associated beliefs are considered as
major influencing factors on their SM behaviors and outcome. According to a recent
study, 42% of respondents in the 18 to 29
age groups were unable to answer any question about privacy law correctly (Cowan,
2010). Cyber-criminals preying on them can
be considered as the “rare enemy” since
youths and teens haven’t yet developed
counterpoison to deal with them.
A parallel can be drawn from the literature on
physical crimes. Most cyber-criminals that
prey upon SM users employ a similar modus
operandi as in physical crimes which involve
gaining access to and trust of the victim. The
victimization process can viewed as a temporal sequence of activities through which the
crime progresses. For instance, offenders
against children (such as, pedophiles) usually
use the power of persuasion and friendship to
first gain the trust of the child, and in some
cases parents, as well. Friendship is a critical
step toward gaining cooperation (Elliott,
Browne and Kilcoyne, 1995; Leclerc, Beaure-
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gard and Proulx, 2008; Murray, 2000). We
would argue that fraudsters find it easy to
gain trust and cooperation of SM users who
have no past experience of distrust. One
online romance scam victim, Sally Schrock
reported that a scammer she met on a social
networking site started sending her gifts
(gaining trust) (kmbc.com, 2006). The scammer then asked for her Social Security number and e-mail password (gaining cooperation).
Additionally, part of the fascinating character
of social networks stems from the fact that
they are built on trust-based architectures.
The real or perceived relationships of trust
that connect social networking users increase
scammers’ chance of gaining trust and cooperation from potential victims. For, for example, a fraudulent message sent from a SM
user’s social network is often considered to
be more trustworthy compared to random a
spam message (Ramsey and Venkatesan,
2010).

Discussion and Implications
SM providers are pushing their users a bit too
hard to share personal information. A convenient but possibly false assumption among
some SM providers is that the Internet generation values openness and cares less about
privacy (Cowan, 2010). In April 2010, Facebook came up with new rules, which required
members to share more information (Lyons,
2010).
One way to understand SM providers’ orientation towards security and privacy would be
to examine them in the backdrop of current
institutional arrangements and technological
development. For SM providers (such as, Facebook) to maintain control over various actors (e.g., consumers, advertisers, regulators
and privacy advocacy groups), a proper decoupling of responses is needed. Decision
makers in social networking sites simultaneously utilize different combinations of actions
in parallel that reflect their mixed reading of
the environment (George, Chattopadhyay,
Sitkin and Barden, 2006).Various institutional
actors differ in terms of power they have to
affect an organization’s (e.g., Facebook’s)
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outcome. Different theoretical contributions
and various empirical studies have led to the
accepted view that the exact nature of decoupling is a function of relative powers of
competing organizational and institutional interests (March and Olsen, 1989; Oliver, 1991;
Pfeffer, 1981a, b; Westphal and Zajac, 1994,
1998, 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). These studies also provide support for the notion
that substantial responses cannot be made to
appease two sets of actors that diametrically
oppose one another. More to the point, the
substantive response relates to the threat or
opportunity associated with the actor that is
perceived to be more powerful and the symbolic response relates to the threat or opportunity associated with the actor perceived to
possess less power (George, Chattopadhyay,
Sitkin, and Barden, 2006).
Facebook’s substantive response relates to
the advertising opportunity. That is, advertisers are more powerful actors than consumers
from the company’s standpoint. A Newsweek
article asserted (Lyons, 2010):
The truth is, Zuckerberg [Facebook founder
and CEO] needs your data. His business is
built on it. You are not Facebook's customer.
You are its inventory--you are the product
Facebook is selling. Facebook's real customers are advertisers. You're useful only
because you can be packaged and sold. The
more information Facebook extracts from
you, the more you are worth. Consider that
in 2005, Facebook's privacy policy was one
sentence long and said that none of your info would be shared with anyone who wasn't
in one of your groups. Today the policy is
longer than the Constitution and requires a
lawyer to parse its meaning. Why doesn't
Facebook just use its original one-sentence
policy? I'll take a wild guess and say advertisers, not members, were the driving force
here.

As to the involvement of the third party developer in the value chain, it is worth noting that
an innovation’s success hinges on having
well-developed systems and components that
are interoperable and compatible with a company’s products and the creation of externalities. Such products help create a promising
innovation ecosystems–“the collaborative ar-
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rangements through which firms combine
their individual offerings into a coherent, customer-facing solution” (Adner, 2006).
A final observation is that the widespread use
of social networking platforms can be considered as a part of a more general trend toward
cloud computing (Ramsey and Venkatesan,
2010). In this regard, various security risks
and challenges associated with cloud computing deserve attention (Kshetri, 2010b, 2011).
Managerial Implications
Our account has implications for management practices. In light of the lack of welldeveloped institutional frameworks such as
regulations, and ethical and professional
standards, there is a strong need for organizations to develop policies, culture and techniques to manage and monitor SM uses within an organization. Organizations that have
clear policy, procedures, limits, and instructions regarding the use of SM are less likely
to become targets or victims of various forms
of cybercrimes. For instance, as noted above,
apps downloaded from less reputed websites
are more likely to pose security risks. In this
regard, organizations need to have a clear
policy regarding apps download in devices
owned by the organization. For instance,
some online game apps may not only lead to
a decline in employee performance but also
to an increased security risk.
In light of organizations' use of SM in diverse
activities, it is also important to have clear
policies and guidelines regarding posts on
SM networks by employees. It may also be
important to regularly monitor online posts on
SM sites by employees, which may lead to a
leak of organizational secrets. This is especially important for organization dealing with
sensitive information such as hospitals and
government departments.
From organizations’ standpoint, criminal activities of various cybercrime firms are not the
only risks associated with SM. Sometimes
organizations are likely to become targets
and victims of unfair and unjust criticisms that
are raised by various stakeholders through
social media campaigns. In such cases, or-

ganizations can use SM to defend themselves against unjust criticisms from these
campaigners. That is, just like diamond is the
only material hard enough to cut diamond
effectively, SM can be an effective tool to
fight against a social media campaign targeted against a company. A nice and striking
example to illustrate this point would be
Procter & Gamble’s (P&G) use of social media to address concerns of a group of consumers that were dissatisfied with its Dry Max
technology, who initiated a Facebook campaign against the technology. In 2009, P&G
introduced the technology into its Pampers
product line, which also received awards from
parenting magazines (Heussner, 2010). A
customer reported that her child had developed a diaper rash, who created a Facebook
page in an attempt force P&G to withdraw the
product. By May 2010, 7,000 parents had
joined the anti-Dry Max campaign, which created intense pressures on the firm to withdraw the product from the market (Barwise
and Seán, 2010). P&G was, however, confident in Dry Max’s performance thanks to its
long experience in such products. The company’s experience was that some proportions
of babies always develop rashes. P&G’s wellestablished SM networks such as Pampers
Village and Pampers Facebook page proved
to be highly effective to fight against the antiDry Max campaign. Through these platforms,
P&G made its case sympathetically, clearly
and authoritatively. The company responded
to all complaints, offered advices, and explained compelling reasons as to why the
product would not be withdrawn. A September 2010 report of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission indicated that the
agency found no link between Dry Max and
the occurrence of diaper rash.
Concluding Comments
Management of security risks is a critical
practical challenge that organizations face in
the digital economy. The above analysis indicates that the SM security and privacy challenges are significant. Social networking sites
are a potential goldmine for cyber-criminals. It
is clear from the privacy and security approaches of SM providers that they have lost
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sight of what had made them great. Most SM
users, on the other hand, lack precautionary
measures in their SM activities. There has
also been a lack of defensive measures or
counterpoison.
Ensuring that both technological and behavioral/perceptual factors are given equal consideration in the design and implementation
of a computer network is thus crucial. Technological measures range from simply disconnecting databases containing sensitive
information from the Internet to the deployment of sophisticated anti-fraud technologies.
Similarly, simple behavioral measures can
stop some serious cybercrimes. A simple
training strategy aimed at improving the ability of employees to use SM more securely is
likely to reduce a significant proportion of cybercrimes.
Finally, today, there is an emerging trend toward the use of contents posted on social
media as evidence in civil and criminal proceedings (Supreme Court of Singapore,
2010). This trend is likely to affect the naïve
(e.g. youths and teens) more than the general
population. The above discussion also indicates that a failure to understand the context
of SM use is also likely to lead to an exposé
of wrongdoing.
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Footnotes
1

Here is how click fraud on Facebook works. A fraudster may use fake accounts logs in to Facebook and
views the ads that are displayed. When a competitor’s
ads are displayed, the fraudster clicks them. Note that,
according to Facebook rules, up to six clicks on an ad
by a user in a 24 hour period are charged to the advertiser (Techcrunch.com 2009). Fraudsters reportedly
create thousands of fake Facebook accounts with a
wide variety of demographic information. One advertiser
reportedly paid $200 to an Indian operation for 2,000
Facebook accounts. The going rate was $10 per 100
accounts if unique email accounts are supplied. Once
the accounts are created, they use software to fill out
the varied demographic information, and that software
also manages all these accounts (Techcrunch.com
2009).
2

The concept of manifest and latent functions (Merton
1968) can be very helpful in understanding astroturfers’
behaviors. Manifest functions are explicitly stated and
understood by the participants in the relevant action
and the consequences can be observed or expected.
Latent functions are those that are not explicitly stated
or recognized by the people involved. In a SM campaign, for instance, the manifest posture is bloggers’
testimonials about certain brands, but below the surface
deeply ingrained are various actions orchestrated by
Astroturfers.
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